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Abstract 
 
As with all aspects of public management, the control, financing and regulation of 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are matters subject to changing international trends 
and  domestic  political  imperatives  (OECD  2005).    What  the  effects  of  the  global 
financial crisis will be on the ownership and financing of SOEs is slowly unfolding 
but will undoubtedly be heavily influenced by a new era of public sector reforms 
principally designed to reassert central political controls as well as fiscal pressures to 
balance state budgets.  Responses have not been uniform - while many states are 
resorting to sales of their assets, certain enterprises, most notably banks, have come 
into public ownership and reversed the privatisation trend of recent decades.  The role 
of the state is therefore once again in need of reconsideration (Skocpol 2008). 
   
Drawing  on  the  Irish  case,  the  issues  of  state-owned  enterprise  ownership, 
management and financing are addressed in this paper.  Findings from two datasets - 
one concerning aspects of the corporate governance of existing Irish SOEs collected 
in 2008 (MacCarthaigh 2009) and another which presents a time-series analysis of 
Irish  commercial  and  non-commercial  public  bodies  since  1924  will  identify  the 
contemporary challenges faced by SOEs and how they are responding to them.  The 
study will be informed by insights from institutional and organizational theory, as 
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Introduction: Managing state-owned enterprises 
 
How best to exercise ownership rights over state-owned enterprises has long been a 
matter  of  considerable  debate  amongst  scholars  of  politics,  economics,  public 
administration  (Seidman  1954).    It  is  of  course  also  a  matter  of  great  concern  to 
political  executives  (and  their  political  opponents)  as  not  only  do  they  own 
commercial  undertakings  outright,  it  is  also  the  case  that  for  most  states  a  large 
percentage  of  GDP  is  channelled  through  publicly-listed  state  enterprises.  
Furthermore,  through  pension  and  mutual  funds,  citizens  own  many  current  (and 
former) state enterprises.  Thus the control and accountability of such organisations 
remains politically salient at all times. 
 
The recent financial crisis has nonetheless re-opened some of the more traditional 
concerns and established norms about the state’s role in business.  In particular, the 
relationship of state-owned enterprises to their shareholders, and the manner in which 
they are governed, has become part of national discourses as governments seek to 
nurse  damaged  economies  and  provide  stable  domestic  financial  markets.    The 
nationalisation of individual banks, whilst attracting much public opprobrium, also 
puts firmly into reverse a policy of privatisation that had established itself in many 
parts  of  the  globe  during  the  1980s.    Relatedly,  the  issue  of  good  corporate 
governance and values within enterprise has also received a radical reappraisal. 
 
The wave of privatisations that characterised developed countries attitudes towards 
SOEs during the 1980s and 1990s were as result of a desire to reduce subsidies to 
inefficient companies. The logic of such divestments was to remove the uncertainties 
that  SOEs  held  for  state  balance  sheets;  thus  macroeconomic  stability  would  be 
achieved.  For those SOEs surviving into the 1990s, WTO (and EU) agreements and 
rules limited state provision of grants and subsidies, and the lure of lucrative salaries 
in  private  companies,  drained  management  talent  away.  By  the  turn  of  the  21
st 
century, the increased internationalisation of SOEs through decreasing dependence on 
government assistance, greater exposure to international stock market requirements, 
and new corporate governance controls has resulted in greater financial reporting and 
control requirements. 
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So how are SOEs managed by governments?  In this paper, drawing on a survey of 
Irish  SOEs  conducted  during  2008/9,  we  consider  in  some  detail  aspects  of  SOE 
autonomy  in  relation  to  personnel,  policy  and  finance.    We  also  examine  the 
relationship between Irish SOEs and their shareholders.  Finally, we consider some of 
the challenges facing SOEs in the current crisis.  To begin, the categorisation of SOEs 
in the context of state organisation is presented, as is an historical overview of Irish 
SOEs. 
 
How best to conceptualise commercial state-enterprises? 
The economic arguments for creating SOEs have been well-rehearsed. The OECD 
summarise these as follows: 
-  The state may be the appropriate monopolist in an economic sector where an 
interlocking supply network is required for the provision of goods or services. 
-  The State may become involved in the supply of goods or services which the 
private sector is not incentivised to supply.   
-  Some merit goods are inadequately provided for in a free market system or 
there may be a principled reason for taking them out of the market.   
-  The private sector may overproduce certain goods with negative externalities.  
-  If the State cannot regulate effectively or successfully contract for services, or 
cannot credibly promise not to confiscate or excessively tax enterprises, thus 
inhibiting investment, then it should become directly engaged in enterprise 
(OECD 2005: 20-1). 
 
However, as well as economic approaches to explaining the emergence, survival and 
death of SOEs, there is a growing literature that seeks to place them in the wider 
context of public organizations.  Flinders argues that ‘the state consists of a highly 
heterogeneous network of organizations’ (2006: 223).  For Dijkstra and van der Meer 
(2003),  the  multiple  dichotomies  used  to  distinguish  between  types  of  public 
organisation, and the multidimensional character of the public/private distinction, is to 
a  large  extent  based  on  the  use  of  different  perspectives  on  organizations:  1)  a 
political control and institutional perspective, 2) a legal status perspective, 3) a legal 
and regulatory power perspective, 4) a legal/economic ownership perspective, and 5) 
an  economic  funding  perspective.    Trying  to  capture  and  comprehend  these 
organisations  through  which  the  state  operates  has  been  the  subject  of  much   4 
scholarship and draws on a variety of disciplines, particularly organisational theory 
and political science.  The lenses used to differentiate between organisations have 
focused  variously  on  formal-legal  type  (Roness  2007;  Wettenhall  2005),  tasks 
(Dunleavy 1991), state activities (Hardiman and Scott 2010), and policy field (UN 
COFOG  categorization).    In  his  dissection  of  ‘public  agencies’  Scott  (2008)  goes 
further and identifies six variables which can be used to distinguish between them: 1) 
ownership, 2) legal form, 3) funding, 4) function, 5) powers and organizational form, 
and 6) governance level.  Recently, there has also been considerable focus on the 
concept  of  ‘agencies’  as  a  subject  of  inquiry  (Pollitt  at  el  2004;  Christensen  & 
Lægreid  2006),  with  detailed  cross-national  studies  also  beginning  to  emerge 
(Verhoest  et  al.  2010).  In  the  main,  these  studies  focus  on  non-commercial 
organisations.  
 
Within  the  organizational  zoo  of  the  modern  state  are  a  group  of  entities  which 
operate  in  explicitly  market  environments  and  which,  though  under  state  control, 
enjoy considerable autonomy in operational terms as they seek to generate profits for 
shareholders.  Adopting  the  view  of  state  organisations  as  a  series  of  ‘concentric 
circles’, with the political executive at the centre, the most common understanding of 
SOEs is that they revolve on the outer orbit of the central state, where the public 
sphere meets the marketplace proper.  Table 1 below depicts the position of these 
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While this does provide a reasonable conceptualisation of these bodies, it doesn’t 
allow for the fact that many SOEs are in reality ‘closer’ to the corridors of power than 
non-commercial  public  organisations  and  can  play  a  very  important  role  in  the 
successful functioning of an economy.  For example, industrial unrest within utility 
companies can have a more serious impact on government survival than strikes within 
the  non-commercial  public  sector  or  even  the  private  sector.    Also,  patronage 
appointments by governments to Boards of SOEs has traditionally ensured a direct 
form of accountability in relation to policy decisions, though this is now challenged 
by tighter corporate governance requirements on Board members (below).   6 
 
In terms of function, normatively speaking and drawing on Dunleavy’s (1991) classic 
categorisation,  SOEs  are  considered  as  trading  agencies.    This  categorisation, 
however, disguises the extent to which many of them are involved in extensive non-
trading activity.  Apart from universal service obligations, adhering to and achieving 
environmental  objectives  and  demonstrating  corporate  social  responsibility  have 
moved up the agenda of SOE management teams and Boards.
1  Reflecting this, in 
their recent study of SOEs, Wettenhall and Thynne (2010) explore the boundaries of 
the public and private spheres and note the revival of ‘community’-based concepts of 
participation in public administration, including state owned enterprise management. 
They also document, however, the shift in the conceptualisation of SOE ownership 
from public to state to government.  In the context of the global financial crisis and 
greater  public  ownership  of  financial  institutions,  the  concept  of  community 
ownership  challenges  the  traditional  model  of  ‘arms-length’  engagement  by 
governments in SOEs.   
 
Management of State-Owned Enterprise ownership policy 
The  manner  in  which  SOEs  shareholdings  are  managed  by  their  shareholders  is 
constantly  evolving.    As  the  OECD  identifies  (Figure  1  below),  the  most  recent 
development  in  managing  ownership  policy  is  the  delegation  of  shareholding 
responsibilities to single organisational units.  This system has traditionally been used 
in the Nordic states, (where there is a strong tradition of state ownership and SOEs 
form a large part of the national economy) but also within EU states such as Belgium, 
Poland and Spain.  What is of interest is the attraction towards this model not only by 
countries more associated with strong statist tradition (France) but also by countries 






                                                 
1 For example, in the survey of Irish SOE’s (below), while over a third have public service obligations 
to particular social groups, 20% are required to achieve certain environmental objectives and 28% must 
demonstrate corporate social responsibility. 
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Source: Adapted from OECD (2005: 43) 
 
 
Within the centralised model, the form taken by these single ownership entities ranges 
from advisory bodies to holding companies to  organisations with full authority to 
direct SOEs to achieve certain policy goals.  For example, in Britain, the Shareholder 
Executive was created in 2003 to pool expertise that had previously been dispersed 
across Whitehall.  While it retains direct responsibility for only a few SOEs, it has 
adopted  an  increased  number  of  shareholding  responsibilities  and  now  covers  28 
SOEs across 12 departments.  In Austria, the ÖIAG (Österreichische Industrieholding 
AG  -  Austrian  Industries  Holding  Company)  has  a  dual  mandate  of  seeking  to 
enhance  the  value  of  those  SOEs  within  its  remit,  while  also  seeking  where 
appropriate to partially or fully privatize those SOEs.  
 
The most influential of all single ownership units are used by a number of Nordic 
countries.  In Finland, the Prime Minister’s Department has an ‘ownership steering 
department’ which is charged with the state’s ownership policy for SOEs.  Similarly, 
in  Sweden,  a  ‘state-owned  companies’  section  within  the  Ministry  of  Enterprise, 
Energy and Communications performs a similar role and an annual report comparing   8 
the work and performance of all SOEs is produced (Ministry of Enterprise, Energy 
and Communications 2008). Norway also has a ‘state ownership’ department within 
its Ministry of Trade and Industry to co-ordinate policy for Norway’s 80 SOEs. 
 
A recent survey by the OECD found that the most active areas of governance reform 
within SOEs in the last five years have been in respect of  
-  Privatization,  which  remains  as  an  important  policy  tool  not  just  in  developing 
states, but also within developed economies (e.g. Belgium, Sweden). 
-  The  introduction  of  corporate  governance  codes  for  SOEs,  (and  relatedly  the 
growing interest in the role of ‘independent directors’) 
- The reorganization of the ownership function (Dincer 2010) 
 
Of  particular  interest  for  this  paper  is  the  trend  towards  centralisation  of  SOEs 
ownership policy, reinforced by the global spread of ideas concerning the need for 
consistent corporate governance practices across private and public companies.   
 
We turn here to consider in more detail the development of Irish SOEs. 
 
Creation and closure of Irish state-owned enterprises 
The  problem  of  classifying  the  diverse  forms  of  organisation  exercising  forms  of 
public authority is particularly acute in common law jurisdictions based on the public 
interest where the relationship between legal form, function and authority is less well 
defined than in civil law Rechtsstaat systems (Wollmann 2003; Pollitt and Bouckaert 
2004).    Thus  in  states  such  as  Ireland,  public  sector  organisations  have  proved 
themselves  particularly  resistant  to  standard  classifications  and  there  is  often 
confusion over terminology.  Writing on Irish agencies, Scott identifies, 
 
A…distinct class of agencies adopts the form of companies of various 
kinds. Some commercial, but state-owned entities, are established as 
statutory corporations in a manner broadly similar to that of statutory 
agencies  generally.  Others  adopt  the  form  of  private  companies  – 
public  (i.e.  listed)  limited  companies,  private  limited  (i.e.  unlisted) 
companies and companies limited by guarantee. The terms semi-state 
or state-sponsored companies are sometimes used to refer to at least 
some of these entities, although it is not clear that this term makes 
their status any clearer. (2008: 4) 
   9 
Adopting a definition of an SOE as ‘a company in which the state has a majority or 
complete shareholding, and which is principally involved in commercial activity in a 
normally competitive market environment’ we can delineate more clearly the number 
of organisations.  Drawing on a time-series database of public institutions in Ireland, 
we are able to discern the gradual increase in the number of SOEs since independence 
in 1922.  The Figure below details the number of SOEs in operation in Ireland for 
each year between the creation of the first one in 1924 and the most recent last year. 
 
Figure 2: State-owned enterprises in Ireland 
































































































































Source: Hardiman, Niamh; MacCarthaigh, Muiris & Scott, Colin. 2010. The Mapping the Irish State 




This chart tells us little about the type of SOE created during this period however.  As 
might be expected, for the early years of the state’s existence, SOEs were created to 
create interlocking networks (such as electricity), harness natural resources (including 
foodstuffs), provide finance (banks) and create means of import substitution for the 
developing economy. A further increase followed during WWII when a number of 
SOEs  were  created  to  ensure  provisions  of  food,  fuel  and  other  essentials  were 
managed effectively. There was a modest increase in the number of SOEs in the post-
War decades and it was not until the 1990s that a series of privatisations occurred 
(Table 2).  
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Table 2: Privatizations of Irish SOEs 
  Name  Policy Domain  When 
1.    Bord Bainne (Milk Board)  Agriculture,  fisheries  and 
forestry 
1975 
2.    Pigs and Bacon Commission  Agriculture,  fisheries  and 
forestry 
1983 
3.    Kilkenny Design Workshops  Recreation,  Culture  & 
Religion 
1988 
4.    Cómhlucht  Siúicre  Eireann, 
Teoranta (Irish Sugar Co.) 
Agriculture,  fisheries  and 
forestry 
1991 
5.    Irish Life Assurance  Enterprise  and  Economic 
Development 
1991 
6.    British & Irish Steampacket  Transport  1992 
7.    Irish Steel  Enterprise  and  Economic 
Development 
1996 
8.    Irish Potato Marketing  Agriculture,  fisheries  and 
forestry 
1997 
9.    Bord Telecom Éireann  Communications  1999 
10.   Irish  National  Petroleum 
Corporation 
Enterprise  and  Economic 
Development 
2001 
11.   ACC Bank  Enterprise  and  Economic 
Development 
2001 
12.   ICC Bank  Enterprise  and  Economic 
Development 
2001 
13.   Trustee Savings Bank  Enterprise  and  Economic 
Development 
2001 
14.   Aer Lingus  Transport  2006 
Source: Hardiman, Niamh; MacCarthaigh, Muiris & Scott, Colin. 2010. The Mapping the Irish State 
database, version 25 February 2010. UCD: The Geary Institute, http://geary.ucd.ie/mapping/. 
 
 
The decline in the number of SOEs arising from privatization have been offset by the 
creation of several new SOEs since the 1990s. (The leap in numbers around 1996 
represents the alternation of the state’s port companies’ status to allow them have a   11 
commercial remit).  As well as the creation of brand new enterprises, a number of 
corporatizations and nationalisations have also occurred over the period in question, 
as Tables 3 and 4 below identify. Table 3 sets out the creation of corporate state 




Table 3: Corporatizations in Ireland 
  Name  Policy Domain  When 
1.  National Film Studios of Ireland  Recreation, culture, 
Religion 
1975 
2.  Bord Telecom Éireann  Communications  1984 
3.   An Post  Communications  1984 
4.  Bus Éireann (Irish Bus); 
Dublin Bus; 
Iarnród Éireann (Irish Rail) 
Transport  1987 
5.  National Oil Reserves Agency  Enterprise and Economic 
Development 
1995 
6.  Ordnance Survey Ireland  General Public Services  2002 
7.  Council for Education, 
Recruitment and Training for the 
Hotel Industry (CERT) 
Education and Training  2003 





Source: Hardiman, Niamh; MacCarthaigh, Muiris & Scott, Colin. 2010. The Mapping the Irish State 
database, version 25 February 2010. UCD: The Geary Institute, http://geary.ucd.ie/mapping/. 
 
 
Table  4  below  profiles  the  nationalization  of  what  had  previously  been  private 
companies.  The  nationalisation  of  Anglo-Irish  bank  in  2009,  in  response  to  the 
imminent collapse of the bank as a consequence of the property crash, represented the 
first nationalisation since the mid-1970s of a private enterprise by the Irish state, and 
rapidly reversed a trend whereby banks under state ownership has been privatised in 
the early 2000s. 
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Table 4: Nationalisations of private enterprise in Ireland 
  Name  Policy Domain  When 
1.  National Theatre Society Ltd  Recreation, culture, 
Religion 
1925 
2.  Irish Life Assurance Co.  General Public Services  1938 
3.  Córas Iompair Éireann (National 
Transport Co.) 
Transport  1944 
4.  National Stud Ltd  Recreation, culture, 
Religion 
1946 
5.  Irish Steel Holdings Ltd  Enterprise and Economic 
Development 
1947 
6.   Arramara Teorante (Alginate 
Industries Ltd) 
Enterprise and Economic 
Development 
1949 
7.  Great Southern Hotels  Enterprise and Economic 
Development 
1961 
8.  British & Irish Steam Packet 
Company 
Transport  1965 
9.  Chester Beatty Library   Recreation, Culture, 
Religion 
1969 
10.  Crafts Council of Ireland  Recreation, Culture, 
Religion 
1976 
11.  Anglo-Irish Bank  Enterprise and Economic 
Development 
2009 
Source: Hardiman, Niamh; MacCarthaigh, Muiris & Scott, Colin. 2010. The Mapping the Irish State 
database, version 25 February 2010. UCD: The Geary Institute, http://geary.ucd.ie/mapping/. 
 
The above Tables identify no clear patterns; this reflects the traditional pragmatic 
approach of  Irish governments to SOEs, which has never been  elaborated beyond 
creating  ‘public  value’.    The  defining  feature  of  government  policy  towards  Irish 
SOEs  has  been  the  relative  absence  of  strong  ideological  views  over  state 
intervention.  Over half a century ago, contrasting socialist states’ planned economic 
development with that of Ireland, Taoiseach (PM) Séan Lemass argued that ‘state-
sponsored bodies’ emerged in Ireland ‘in a more haphazard way to meet particular   13 
needs  and  opportunities  as  they  arose,  when  no  other  course  appeared  to  be 
practicable’ (1959: 278).  Also of interest is the fact that the tendency to create large 
state enterprises receded over time (MacCarthaigh 2009: 11).  
 
Jackson  provides  a  less  benign  view  of  Irish  government  approaches  to  SOE 
ownership (2010: 79-81). He identifies a number of government decisions in relation 
to the activities of SOEs that appear at odds with any economic rationale and which 
have often proved fatal to the commercial viability of many.  He also argues that 
inconsistent policy towards SOEs has ‘hastened the ensuing demise of competitive 
SOEs in Ireland as opposed to those operating in monopoly situations’ (2010: 79). 
 
Just as the type and size of SOEs altered as the State developed, so too did their 
formal-legal character.  Internationally, the original commercial state enterprises in 
areas such as postal service, telegraphs and railroads were organised, financed and 
controlled in much the same way as a government department (Seidman 1954: 183).  
However, as the role of the state in the twentieth century expanded and the limits of 
the  machinery  of  government  exposed,  a  form  of  autonomous  public  body  was 
established  which  normally  took  the  form  of  a  statutory  corporation  (or  state 
company) (Wettenhall 2001). The use of the public corporation form became more 
popular as the remit of government expanded into areas of social as well as economic 
activity, and as the need to substitute political control with an alternative mode of 
management grew more pressing.   
 
In  Westminster-style  democracies,  as  the  idea  of  government-created  and  owned 
enterprises gained in popularity, they were established as statutory companies.  The 
statute itself determined the status of the organisation, its Board composition, powers, 
capital allocation and other key features and characteristics.  The difficulty with the 
statutory company form was that any changes to the role of the enterprise required 
new  amending  legislation.      Thus  the  idea  of  creating  limited  companies  with 
Ministers  as  sole  shareholders  and  which  would  be  subject  to  the  stipulations  of 
companies legislation (for example, the holding of an AGM at which shareholders 
could  attend)  evolved.    It  was  thus  much  more  flexible  and  devolved  much 
shareholder responsibility from government.   
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Management of Irish State Owned Enterprises 
The management of Irish state-owned enterprises has traditionally operated along the 
‘dual-ministry’ model described by the OECD (Figure 1 above), with the Department 
of Finance the co-shareholder with the relevant sectoral Department for virtually all 
SOEs.  Parliamentary involvement in the policy-setting and oversight functions has 
traditionally been  weak.  The major departure  of note was the establishment of a 
‘Joint  Committee  on  Commercial  State  Sponsored  Bodies’  in  1976.    While  the 
committee did not have a role in setting policy for SOEs, it did allow for greater 
engagement with parliamentarians and exposed management and Board members to 
questioning.  In 1996 the Committee dropped the ‘commercial’ in its title and began 
looking at a wider range of state agencies.  Following a general election in 2002 and a 
reorganization  of  the  committee  system,  the  role  of  SOE  oversight  was  dispersed 
between various ministry-shadowing or sectoral committees. 
 
The formal governance system for managing Irish SOEs is detailed in Figure 2 below.  
In  reality,  of  course,  the  system  does  not  follow  these  lines  –  for  example, 
experienced  civil  servants  will  play  an  important  role  in  determining  policy  for 
individual  SOEs;  Ministers  can  use  their  government’s  majority  to  acquire 
parliamentary  approval;  and  these  is  irregular  examination  or  review  of  Board 
appointments by parliament.   





Minister(s)        Parliament 
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The Board of Directors, however, is a central conduit between government and SOE 
management.  The  normal  route  of  Board  appointment  in  Ireland  is  by  the  parent 
Minister,  either  with  or  without  consultation  with  fellow  Ministers  (see  Figure  3 
below).  In practice, the Cabinet is generally notified that a person is to be named to 
an  SOE  Board,  particularly  if  the  SOE  in  question  is  of  significant  national 
importance.  The responsibilities of Directors are increasingly formalized as a result 
of  international  corporate  governance  failures.    Most  recently,  the  Department  of 
Finance released a revised version of its ‘Code of Practice for the Governance of State 
Bodies’,  which  updated  the  2001  edition.   Whereas  its  predecessor  had  not  made 
many  distinctions  between  Board  member  requirements  in  commercial  and  non-
commercial  state  organizations,  this  new  Code  made  more  of  such  allowances.  
Reflecting concerns about a number of domestic incidents involving Boards failing to 
perform their functions, the new Code is stronger in tone and prescriptive on some 
key areas (e.g. travel expenses).  Other new developments include a role for the Chair 
in advising the relevant Minister on competency gaps in the Board, new sections on 
risk  management,  confidential  disclosure,  and  on  performance  and  defining 
expectations. 
 
Figure 3: Board appointments 
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However, apart from these broad trends in international and Irish SOE development, 
there is a lack of more detailed analysis of how SOE autonomy operates in practical 
terms,  and  the  means  through  which  they  are  controlled  by  their  shareholders.  
Drawing on the COBRA
2 survey model adapted to suit the circumstances of SOEs, 




Thirty-seven organisations were sent a questionnaire asking questions on aspects of 
their  autonomy,  control  and  accountability  in  relation  to  a  variety  of  corporate 
governance issues. Twenty-five SOEs responded (68%) and the preliminary findings 
published as a research report (MacCarthaigh 2009).  Eliminating the 5 smallest of 
these  (which  included  those  with  staff  of  less  than  50  and  budgets  of  less  than 
€30million – see Appendix 2), we are left with 20 SOEs for analysis in this paper. 
 
Of  these  SOEs,  over  half  are  statutory  corporations,  while  a  quarter  are  private 














                                                 
2 Comparative public Organization data Base for Research and Analysis. This questionnaire was 
developed in partnership with the Instituut voor de Overheid of the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, 
which has facilitated similar work in other countries through the COST-CRIPO Network.    17 
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limited by guarantee but 
with shares)












Strategic Autonomy: HR policy 
The  ability  to  manage  internal  HR  capacity  is  a  core  feature  of  organisational 
autonomy.  Survey results reveal that in terms of setting general policy positions in 
relation to staff numbers employed, salary levels, tenure, conditions of employment 
and  so  on,  as  might  be  expected,  SOEs  retain  considerable  discretion  (Figure  5).  
(Indeed, one prominent Irish SOE attracted much attention when in the face of tough 
public sector budgetary cutbacks it awarded a pay increase to its staff).  For a small 
number of respondents, however, staff remuneration is heavily influenced by centrally 









Figure 5: Strategic HR 
 
























Turning to HR matters concerning individual members of staff, we find that SOEs 
have, in general, slightly less collective autonomy (Figure 6).  Staff promotions tend 
to be the issue organisations had most autonomy  over, but for other matters, and 
particularly salary levels, individual organisations’ remit extends to most but not all 
staff.  Typically, the remuneration packages of CEOs and other senior staff in SOEs 
require approval from the parent Department and also the Department of Finance. 
Most recently, in the face of severe budgetary pressures, the Irish government has 
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Figure 6: Individual HR 






















Strategic Autonomy: Finance 
While  SOEs  are  rarely  established  on  a  purely  profit-making  basis,  the  extent  to 
which they accrue dividends and other benefits to the state plays an important role in 
their  ongoing  operational  autonomy.    (Many  regulatory  authorities  are  also  self-
financing through the collection of levies and make returns to the Central Fund or 
Exchequer). 
 
As Figure 7 below depicts, approximately two-thirds of SOE derive over 90% of their 
funding from trading goods and services, and only 10% of SOEs derive less than a 
majority of their income from such means.  For this minority, the state provides a 
considerable  portion  of  their  development  costs,  with  a  view  to  reducing  the 
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Half of SOEs claim to have complete discretion over the level of charges they set for 
customers, with no pattern emerging as to the type or market in which these SOEs 
operate.  Most of the remainder require approval from their parent Department(s) or 
regulatory body
3 before setting charges. 
 
In terms of indicators of strategic financial autonomy, respondents were asked about 
four connected issues: 
-  Their ability to take out loans 
                                                 
3 Even though regulatory bodies were presented as an option and not selected, follow up inquiries 
indicate that they have the authority to direct SOEs to raise and lower charges.    21 
-  Their ability to shift budgets across functional areas 
-  Their ability to shift budgets over years, and 
-  Their ability to establish subsidiary companies 
 
Figure 8 identifies that SOEs had most autonomy in relation to shifting budgets by 
function  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  across  years.    In  40%  of  cases,  there  was  no 
possibility for SOEs to carry surpluses across years.  As might be expected given the 
traditionally  tight  controls  exercised  by  the  Department  of  Finance  over  public 
spending,  the  acquisition  of  loans  and  the  creation  of  subsidiaries  could  only  be 
achieved within specified conditions. 
 


















Yes, fully without prior approval or conditions
Yes, but with prior approval or conditions







The  ability  of  SOEs  to  generate  their  own  income  is  a  core  determinant  of  their 
financial independence. However, only in half of all cases was this an unfettered right. 
As Figure 9 details, for most of the remaining organisations, fees and charges they 
intend to use must first be approved by their parent Department or another regulatory 










No. Set by another body.
No.  Set by regulator.
Yes, within conditions set 
by other organisation
Yes, but with prior 
approval or conditions of 
Min/Dept





Turning to the final areas of policy autonomy, the SOEs were asked a number of 
questions  about  their  capacity  to  target  particular  social  groups  and  use  different 
policy instruments.  Figure 10 identifies that while approximately a third of SOEs had 
full autonomy to decide whom to target in the delivery of their services, the remainder 
were obliged to first seek approval or their parent Department or regulator, or were 
already limited in this discretion.  An ever greater proportion were similarly limited in 
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Organisation takes decision itself
Organisation takes decision, following consultation with Minister/Department/Regulator
Organisation takes decision under conditions/restrictions set by Minister/Department
Minister/Department takes decisions, following consultation with SOE
Other
How does SOE decide on target group for policy?




The relationship between SOEs and parent Departments 
Irish  SOEs  operate  within  the  OECD’s  ‘dual  model’.    As  in  other  states,  the 
relationship between SOEs and their parent departments has become more formalised 
and there are more attempts to standardise reporting arrangements and accountability 
requirements.  Performance indicators have gained in importance.  An analysis of 
these  indicators  provides  a  useful  insight  into  the  key  matters  of  concern  to 
Departments. 
 
Figure 11 below identifies that for the 20 SOEs surveyed, the performance indicators 
were most concerned with service quality, resource use, profitability and financial 
results.  The effects of the SOEs’ work on society and the wider economy were not 
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As  with  other  aspects  of  their  corporate  governance,  there  is  considerable  variety 
across SOEs in the way resources are allocated to them.  Survey findings reveal that 
while for SOEs, there is little or no relationship between their performance and their 
resource allocation, for others they are closely linked (Figure 12). 
 









1 (Not at all) 2 3 4 5 (To a large
extent)
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The  fiduciary,  legal,  financial  and  other  responsibilities  of  Board  directors  are 
onerous, and mean that directors are under some pressure to engage fully with their 
responsibilities. Survey findings (Figure 13) indicate that for most SOEs, their Boards 
are becoming less involved in day-to-day operational matters and more concerned 
with broad strategic policy matters. 
 




















Current challenges for CEOs 
The findings above in relation to HR, financial and policy autonomy as well as in 
respect of the relationship between SOEs and their parent Departments demonstrate 
considerable variety and inconsistency across government.  The recent financial crisis 
has also forced the government to seek to maximize all revenue sources available to 
it, and SOEs are under pressure to maximize dividends.  Communications with CEOs 
from  a  selected  number  of  large  Irish  SOEs  also  identify  the  following  three 
challenges facing them and their organizations: 
 
- The cost of raising capital 
While this is not a matter specific to Ireland, concerns during 2009 and 2010 about the 
ability of the Irish government to tackle a rapidly growing budgetary deficit resulted 
in an increased premium for the Irish government to borrow on international markets.    26 
Irish SOE’s have also felt this increased cost in accessing funds for development, 
(though the relationship between the government’s standing in international markets 
and that of individual SOEs is not clear).   
 
- The quality of Boards 
Though a perennial problem for Governments and SOEs, as noted above the demands 
of modern SOE Board membership are considerable.  While interviews suggest that 
patronage-styled  appointments  which  characterized  the  Board  appointment  process 
for  many  years  is  less  common  (not  least  due  to  the  corporate  governance 
requirements), there was an ongoing need to ensure that Board members were capable 
and  had  the  skills  necessary  to  manage  modern  SOEs.    On  a  related  point,  the 
demands of meeting modern corporate governance requirements, and in particular the 
requirement for confidentiality and collegiate decision making, also placed pressure 
on the system of worker-representative Board appointments where it exists. 
 
- The skills and understanding of civil servants of the work of SOEs 
Traditionally, the Irish civil service provided an optimum career choice for second 
and third level graduates.  However, the rapid growth of the Irish economy since the 
mid-1990s resulted in a large number of well-remunerated private sector employment 
opportunities, particularly in the financial products market.  Equally, over the course 
of recent  years, many skilled senior civil servants were attracted to private sector 
employment.  While little work has been conducted on the scale and consequences of 
this movement, a ‘capacity review’ of the Department of Finance, the key shareholder 
for SOEs, found that ‘there has been significant movement of staff within and from 
the Department during the last number of  years due to organisational adjustments 
which were made in order to respond to changes in the business environment, and to 
decentralisation’ (2009: 26).  The review also found skills gaps in key areas relating 
to  SOE  management:  ‘Particular  skills  are  needed  in  areas  such  as  regulatory 
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Conclusions 
 
The financial crisis has brought the ownership and management of SOEs into sharp 
relief.  Not only are they exposed to the harsh conditions of international markets, but 
so too are they subject to domestic demands of governments to exercise public sector 
reform programmes.  While recent years have seen a growing convergence on more 
simple ownership structures, it is not clear how this trajectory has been affected by 
recent events and the contraction of the state’s reach in many aspects of the economy 
(including PPPs).  This study identifies that within individual states, such as Ireland, 
there is a wide variety of practice in relation to corporate governance practices.  In 
this Irish context, the early statist approach to mobilizing resources gave way over 
time  towards  ad  hoc  creation  and  removal  of  SOEs  and  a  greater  preference  for 
market  solutions  to  public  enterprise.    As  a  result,  ownership  and  accountability 
structures today are varied, and the challenges faced by CEOs represent a mix of 
traditional  difficulties  combined  with  those  brought  about  by  more  contemporary 
circumstances. 
 
SOEs will continue to be an important part of national economies, and their corporate 
governance and performance will remain a pre-occupation of governments and their 
administrations.  Other issues not explored here but which also come into play include 
the ongoing rigidity of  work practices, union capture of decision-making, and the 
challenge  of  balancing  political  patronage  appointments  with  good  corporate 
governance practice.  As the development of SOEs reflects of the story of each state’s 
economic and political development, the type and form of SOE, as well as their mode 
of governance, that emerges from the recent crisis will provide much food for thought 
for researchers in this field.     
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Appendix 1: Organizations used in the Analysis 
 
Housing Finance Agency plc                                                                               
TG4                                                                                                      
The Port of Cork Company                                                                                 
Coras Iompair Eireann (Holding Company only)                                                             
Dublin Port Co.                                                                                          
EirGrid plc                                                                                              
Horse Racing Ireland                                                                                     
Irish Greyhound Board                                                                                    
Ordnance Survey Ireland                                                                                  
Railway Procurement Agency                                                                               
Shannon Development                                                                                      
Bord na Mona plc                                                                                         
Bus Atha Cliath - Dublin Bus                                                                             
Bus Eireann                                                                                              
Coillte Teo                                                                                              
Dublin Airport Authority                                                                                 
ESB                                                                                                      
Irish Aviation Authority                                                                                 
RTE                                                                                                      
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Appendix 2: Scatterplot of surveyed organisations (n=20) 











































                                                                                   